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Abstract
In noncooperative cartel formation games, it is usually assumed
that cartel members will maximize their joint payoffs. Through an
example, this note shows that this assumption is problematic, because
it imposes some unnecessary restrictions on cartel members’ actions.
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1 Introduction
The noncooperative coalition (cartel) formation model has been widely ap-
plied in many economic situations, such as collusion in oligopolistic markets
(d’Aspremont et al., 1983; Diamantoudi, 2005), R&D joint ventures (Katz,
1986), customs unions (Yi, 1996), international environmental agreements
(Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994), and sharing of natural re-
sources (Miller and Nkuiya, 2016). In a typical application of this model,
cooperation among players may potentially create a surplus. However, the
existence of externalities and lack of binding agreements may cause free rider
problem, which can hinder cooperation and lead to inefficient outcomes.
One possible method to overcome this problem is to form a cartel that
regulates its members’ actions. Those players that voluntarily choose to be
a member will form the cartel and sign a self-enforcing agreement. When
payoffs are transferable, a commonly used assumption about the agreement
is that all cartel members should coordinate their actions, so as to maximize
their joint payoffs. We call it the MJP assumption, and call the agreement de-
rived by it the MJP agreement. This assumption is intuitive, since otherwise
the cartel members are likely to renegotiate among themselves to replace the
agreement by the MJP agreement so that they could all get larger payoffs.
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Nevertheless, one may still wonder whether the MJP assumption is indeed
reasonable. For example, why the MJP assumption requires that members
of all possible cartels, rather than only the stable ones, to maximize their
joint payoffs? After all, only stable cartels matter, since non-stable ones will
not be formed. Therefore, it seems that the MJP assumption is making too
much restrictions on players’ actions than necessary.
To justify the MJP assumption, we should show that the MJP agreement
can be found to be optimal or is an equilibrium outcome when the agree-
ment is endogenously determined. There are many studies in the coalition
formation literature that discuss the endogenous determination of coalition
agreement. In cooperative game setting, Zhou (1994), Okada (1996), and
Ray and Vohra (1999) highlight that the formation of a coalition and the
allocation of payoffs in this coalition should be determined simultaneously
and endogenously.1 However, to the best of my knowledge, few study in the
noncooperative coalition formation literature has shown explicit evidences
that support or falsify the MJP assumption.
In this note, we present a simple open membership cartel formation
model2 where the MJP agreement will lead to a stable cartel in which all
members are willing to adopt a different agreement. This example shows
that the MJP assumption is indeed problematic.
2 An example
Suppose that there is a public good, which may be produced by a set N =
{1, 2, . . . , 5} of homogeneous players. Let xi denote player i’s output. Player
i’s payoff is3
ui =
∑
k∈N
xk − 1
300
(∑
k∈N
xk
)2
− 1
2
x2i , (1)
which depends on the total output of the good
∑
k∈N xk and i’s individual
cost 1
2
x2i .
The social welfare is the sum of all players’ payoffs
∑
k∈N uk, which is
maximized when x∗i = 4.23 for all i ∈ N . However, each player’s Nash
equilibrium output is x0i = 0.97 < x
∗
i . This commonly known social dilemma
of insufficient provision of public good is caused by the free rider problem.
To overcome this problem, we can form a cartel so as to coordinate its
members’ actions. Consider a two-stage cartel formation game. In stage one,
1See Bloch (2003) for a review.
2Open membership means no player can be prevented from becoming a coalition mem-
ber.
3This payoff function is a special case of that used in Barrett (1994) and many others.
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all players simultaneously decide whether or not to join the cartel. Those
choosing to join become cartel members. In stage two, all members co-
ordinate actions to maximize their joint payoffs (MJP assumption), while
simultaneously non-members choose their own actions.
This game can be solved by backward induction. Suppose that the cartel
formed in stage one is M , with cardinality |M | = m. In stage two, each
non-member j /∈ M chooses output xj to maximize uj, while each member
i ∈M chooses xi to maximize
∑
k∈M uk. In equilibrium, these lead to
xj =
150
155−m + m2 , j /∈M (2)
xi =
150m
155−m + m2 , i ∈M (3)
if |M | = m.
We apply the stability concept introduced by d’Aspremont et al. (1983)
to predict which cartel will form in stage one. When there are |M | = m
members, let uC(m) and uI(m) denote the payoff of a member and a non-
member, respectively. A cartel M /∈ {∅, N} is said to be stable if uI(m) >
uC(m+1), and uC(m) ≥ uI(m−1). Further, N is stable if uC(n) ≥ uI(n−1),
while ∅ is stable if uI(0) > uC(1). A stable cartel is one in which no player
has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from his or her participation decision.
From (1) (2) and (3), the condition for M to be stable is m = 2. Therefore,
the payoff of a cartel member is uC(2) = 4.71; the payoff of a non-member is
uI(2) = 6.08; and the social welfare is 2uC(2) + 3uI(2) = 27.67.
In this example, the MJP assumption requires each member i ∈ M to
follow a specific agreement in stage two — to produce xi =
150m
155−m+m2 if|M | = m. But is this a reasonable assumption? Let us examine this cartel
formation game with the following agreement: each member i ∈ M should
produce xi = 0.5m if |M | = m. As a reaction to this alternative agreement,
the output of each non-member j /∈ M is xj = 300−m2160−2m if |M | = m. Thus, it
is easy to verify that the condition for M to be stable is m = 5, the payoff
of each member is uC(5) = 8.85, and the social welfare is 5uC(5) = 44.27.
This outcome shows that everyone (including members, non-members,
and the social planner who cares about social welfare) will agree to change
the cartel agreement from xi =
150m
155−m+m2 to xi = 0.5m. The new agreement is
better than the MJP agreement, irrespective of the criterion used to evaluate
it. Intuitively, this is because the new agreement provides a smaller incentive
for players to free ride on other players’ effort than the MJP agreement
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does4. As a result, more players choose to join the cartel and a more efficient
outcome is realized.
3 Discussion
We have shown that the MJP assumption is problematic despite seeming
quite intuitive and being widely applied. At least under some situations,
everyone has an incentive to replace the agreement based on the MJP as-
sumption by one that provides less free-riding incentive. The problem with
the MJP assumption is that it imposes some unnecessary restrictions on
members’ actions. We should only care about players’ payoffs in a stable
cartel, rather than the payoffs in all possible cartels.
Since agreements are not binding, some readers may wonder whether
the non-MJP agreement xi = 0.5m is renegotiation-proof against the MJP
agreement xi =
150m
155−m+m2 . That is, once the cartel is formed and all players
receive their payoffs under xi = 0.5m, will the members have incentives to
switch this agreement to the MJP agreement? In fact, none of the members
will choose to do so, since otherwise their payoffs will either decrease from
8.85 to 4.71 (as a member), or decrease from 8.85 to 6.08 (as a non-member).
A question is whether the new agreement (xi = 0.5m) is “optimal”. The
point is that an explicit criterion is needed to establish whether or not an
agreement is “optimal”. For future studies, a lesson we can learn from this
note is that a cartel agreement should be endogenously determined, rather
than exogenously given. Under noncooperative coalition formation setting,
some studies (Carraro et al., 2009; Ko¨ke and Lange, 2017; Mao, 2017) have
already discussed endogenous agreements of cartel formation models in some
specific applications, but more work is needed in more general situations.
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